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Our preferences are influenced by what other people
like, but depend critically on howwe feel about those
people, a classical psychological effect called
‘‘cognitive balance.’’ Here, we manipulated prefer-
ences for goods by telling participants the prefer-
ences of strongly liked or disliked groups of other
people. Participants’ preferences converged to
those of the liked group, but diverged from the dis-
liked group. Activation of dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC) tracked the discrepancy between
one’s own preference and its social ideal and was
associated with subsequent preference change
(toward the liked and away from the disliked group),
even several months later. A follow-up study found
overlapping activation in this same region of dmPFC
with negative monetary outcomes, but no overlap
with nearby activations induced by response con-
flict. A single social encounter can thus result in
long-lasting preference change, a mechanism that
recruits dmPFC and that may reflect the aversive
nature of cognitive imbalance.
INTRODUCTION
Our preferences for goods are influenced by what other people
prefer (Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). As the internet has become
pervasive, we are often exposed to information about what is
popular among a certain group of people (e.g., one’s friends,
one’s school, people in other countries, and so forth). Having
preferences that are different from those of people we like and
having preferences that are similar to those of people that we
dislike are both undesirable. One would therefore expect that
we change our preferences not only to be more similar to those
of people we like, but also to be more dissimilar to those of
people we dislike, an effect with a long history in social psy-
chology dubbed ‘‘cognitive balance’’ (Heider, 1946, 1958). Since
the theory was proposed more than five decades ago, it has
stimulated a huge number of studies (see Abelson et al., 1968;
Gawronski and Strack, 2012; Insko, 1984; Zajonc, 1968), and,
because of the theory’s wide applications, it has remained
strongly influential across all of social psychology (see Green-
wald et al., 2002; Walther and Weil, 2012). Although there have
been several recent investigations of the neural mechanismsunderlying how our preferences are influenced by the opinions
of others in general (i.e., social conformity) (Berns et al., 2010;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2012a, 2012b; Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Zaki et al., 2011), it
remains unknown how the brain incorporates our attitude
toward other people into such influence, and whether such
effects are transient or more permanent. Elucidating a specific
neural mechanism to explain the ubiquitous effect of other
people’s opinions on our own preferences is of high relevance
also for marketing and advertising, and would importantly inform
classical social psychology theories that are based on our need
to maximize cognitive consistency and congruency (Abelson
et al., 1968; Festinger, 1957; Gawronski and Strack, 2012;
Greenwald et al., 2002; Heider, 1946, 1958; Osgood and
Tannenbaum, 1955).
To investigate how people’s preferences are influenced by
those of others, we used the framework of balance theory
(Heider, 1946, 1958), which states that our preferences for
objects change so as to become similar to the preferences of
people we like, and dissimilar to the preferences of people we
dislike (Figure 1). In balance theory, balance depends on a triadic
relationship between self, another person(s), and an object being
evaluated (Figure 1A). A triadic relationship includes three
attitudes: (1) one’s attitude toward the other person, (2) one’s
attitude toward the object, and (3) the other person’s attitude
toward the same object. A balanced triad occurs when all the
attitudes are positive, or two are negative and one is positive
(for example, two individuals have a negative attitude toward
an object, but they like each other). If a state is imbalanced, an
individual is motivated to change one of their attitudes (either
about the other person, or about the object) in order to restore
balance (Heider, 1946, 1958).
In the present study, regional brain activation was measured
with BOLD-fMRI while participants (n = 18) rated their prefer-
ences for t-shirts (n = 174; Figures 1B and 1C), saw other
people’s preferences for the same t-shirts (Figure 1D), and
then re-evaluated the t-shirts a second time. Critically, we
employed two groups of other people, validated to be strongly
liked or disliked (see the Supplemental Information available
online for details): in some trials, participants were given
feedback about how their fellow students rated the t-shirt
(‘‘students’’; liked group), whereas in other trials, they found
out how sex offenders rated it (‘‘offenders’’; disliked group). A
further question of interest was whether the preference changes
induced by cognitive imbalance in our study might persist. Four
months after the fMRI study, we therefore asked participants
(15/18) to rate the same t-shirts a third time.Neuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 563
Figure 1. Balance Theory and Experimental Protocol
(A) Arrows represent the direction of evaluation together with indicated valence
(+, like; –, dislike). Any imbalanced state has an odd number of negative (–)
attitudes. The figure shows an example of an imbalanced state (e.g., one
negative attitude) that would motivate a change in one’s evaluation of the
object (toward increased preference in this example).
(B) Present experiment. Participants were students at the California Institute of
Technology (Caltech). Their attitude toward others wasmanipulated by using a
validated liked group (fellow Caltech students) and disliked group (sex
offenders). Participants rated their preferences for t-shirts and were sub-
sequently given feedback about the other group’s preferences for the same
t-shirts.
(C) During the first preference-rating task, subjects rated 174 t-shirt designs
using a 14 point scale. Immediately after rating a t-shirt, subjects viewed their
own preference and the preference of one of the two groups (either Caltech
students or sex offenders), dichotomized as liked or disliked. Thumbs-up
corresponded to ratingsR8 and thumbs-down to ratings%7 on the 14 point
scale.
(D) Eight possible combinations of subjects’ preference and others’ preference
(plus two control conditions). Four of them represent imbalanced states
(highlighted by red squares) according to balance theory.
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The Neural Correlates of Cognitive BalanceWe hypothesized that posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC),
which includes dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), dorso-
medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and presupplementary motor
area (pre-SMA), plays a key role in representing imbalanced
states and subsequent preference change. The pMFC is acti-
vated by a variety of aversive outcomes (Hikosaka and Isoda,
2010; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Shackman et al., 2011), including
monetary loss (O’Doherty et al., 2003), reduced reward (Bush
et al., 2002; Shima and Tanji, 1998) and negative feedback
(Jocham et al., 2009; Miltner et al., 1997; Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2003), error detection (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Holroyd
and Coles, 2002), physical and social pain (Eisenberger and564 Neuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.Lieberman, 2004), as well as by demands for cognitive control
(e.g., response conflict) (Botvinick et al., 2001). Several theories
of pMFC function proposed to account for these diverse findings
(Alexander and Brown, 2011; Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick et al.,
2001; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Rushworth et al., 2004; Yeung
et al., 2004) all agree on an important role in detecting changes
in the environment (especially negative ones including un-
favorable outcomes and response conflict) that entail subse-
quent behavioral adjustment (Botvinick et al., 2001; Eisenberger
and Lieberman, 2004; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; Shackman et al., 2011; Ullsperger et al., 2004). It
was also recently proposed that pMFC may be a key area in
inducing palliative responses following various types of incon-
sistency described in social psychological theories (Proulx
et al., 2012). While this idea of pMFC function generally fits
well with balance theory, we nonetheless used a whole-brain
approach in our initial analyses.
To provide initial insight into the neural processes correspond-
ing to the hypothesized pMFC activation underlying balance
theory, we also had our subjects complete two independent
localizer tasks known from prior studies to activate sectors of
this region. It could be argued (Harmon-Jones, 2004) that cogni-
tive imbalance constitutes a type of cognitive conflict, recruiting
the pMFC for the same reason that this region is activated in
simple speeded-response tasks such as Stroop or flanker tasks:
the simultaneous activation of incompatible response represen-
tations (response conflict) (Botvinick et al., 2001). The other pos-
sibility, as originally stated in balance theory (Heider, 1958), is
that cognitive imbalance might simply be aversive, recruiting
the pMFC as a form of negative feedback or aversive outcome
(Miltner et al., 1997; Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003). These
two possibilities may reflect functional dissociations mapping
to anatomically distinct sectors of the pMFC (Hikosaka and
Isoda, 2010; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Rushworth et al., 2004).
To provide further insight, we used two independent localizer
tasks to identify, within pMFC, areas previously implicated in
processing response conflict (using the Multi-Source Interfer-
ence Task or MSIT) (Bush and Shin, 2006) and areas involved
in processing aversive outcomes (using the Monetary Incentive
Delay Task or MIDT) (Knutson et al., 2000).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results: Impression Ratings
From the multiple attitude ratings that participants gave about
the two social groups, all endorsed a positive attitude toward
their fellow students at the California Institute of Technology
(Caltech) (mean rating = 9.23) but a strongly negative attitude
toward sex offenders (mean = 1.85, on a scale from 1 to 14).
The difference in the impression ratings between two groups
was highly significant (t(17) = 12.9, p < 0.001).
Behavioral Results: The Effect of Cognitive Imbalance
on Preference
Participants’ preferences for the t-shirts changed aspredictedby
balance theory (Heider, 1946, 1958): toward the preferences of
the student group and away from those of the offender group
(Figure 2A). Specifically, subjects’ preferences for t-shirts they
Figure 2. Preference Change and dmPFC
Activation Induced by Cognitive Imbalance
(A) Self-reported preference change between
second and first ratings. Red arrows indicate
imbalanced conditions. See also Figures S1
and S2.
(B) dmPFC regions significantly correlated with the
degree of cognitive imbalance (Cognitive Imbal-
ance Index; CII) in each trial. See also Figures S3
and S4.
(C) Breakdown of activation patterns in dmPFC
during the feedback period of the first preference-
rating tasks. Beta values were extracted using a
leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) cross-validation
procedure from the nearest local maximum from
the peak activation identified by the conjunction
analysis (see Experimental Procedures for more
details). Especially high activations were observed
in imbalanced conditions (red arrows). Means and
SEM are shown.
See also Figure S6.
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The Neural Correlates of Cognitive Balanceinitially disliked increased after they learned that other students
liked or offenders disliked the same items, whereas their prefer-
ences for t-shirts they initially liked decreased after they learned
that students disliked or offenders liked the same items. This
was borne out by a 2 (group)3 2 (self-preference)3 2 (other pref-
erence) repeated-measuresANOVAshowing a significant group-
by-other preference interaction (F(1,17) = 9.41, p = 0.007).
As preferences were rated using a 14 point scale (see
Experimental Procedures for details), the degree of cognitiveNeuron 78, 563imbalance in each trial could be quanti-
fied parametrically as the difference
between a participant’s ratings and the
(binary) preference of the other group
(Cognitive Imbalance Index [CII] ranging
from 0 to 13; see Experimental Proce-
dures; Table S1). Thus, the greater the dif-
ference between self-ratings and student
preferences, or the smaller the difference
between self-ratings and offender prefer-
ences, the greater the CII. To test whether
larger CIIs motivate greater preference
change as hypothesized by balance
theory (Heider, 1946, 1958), we conduct-
ed linear regressions, separately for each
group (students, offenders), with pre-
ference change (second ratings – first
ratings) as the dependent variable and
the signed CII as the predictor variable
(see Experimental Procedures for details).
CII significantly predicted subsequent
preference change for both groups (p <
0.001), and there was no significant
difference between the effect of the two
groups (p = 0.41, not significant; Fig-
ure S1A). All effects remained significant
when including the raw first rating as aseparate regressor, to account for any possible effects of regres-
sion to the mean (see Supplemental Information; Figure S2 for
details).
Remarkably, subjects’ preferences remained socially influ-
enced even after several months had passed. We observed
the same significant group-by-other preference interaction
(F(1,14) = 9.15, p = 0.009), and the CII significantly predicted sub-
jects’ preferences for both groups after 4 months (Figures S1B
and S1C). This persistent preference change was all the more–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 565
Table 1. CII-Related Brain Regions for Both Liked and Disliked
Groups
Location BA MNI Coordinate Z Cluster Size
x y z
dmPFC 8/9/10/32 2 48 36 4.81 948
Left IFG 44/45 44 20 10 4.82 638
Left insula 13 30 18 26 5.40
PCC 31 4 54 26 4.54 288
Areas are identified by a conjunction analysis between CIIs for Caltech
students and CIIs for sex offenders. BA, Brodmann area. A statistical
threshold was set at p < 0.001 voxelwise (uncorrected) and cluster
p < 0.05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons).
Figure 3. Pooled Within-Subject Correlations between Preference
Change and dmPFC Activation
(A and B) dmPFC activations significantly predicted subsequent preference
change: (A) several minutes after viewing others’ preferences (18 subjects 3
8 conditions = 144 data points) and, (B) even after 4 months (15 subjects 3
8 conditions = 120 data points). y axis indicates preference change for each
condition in the predicted direction (i.e., higher value indicates preference
increase in Caltech students-like or sex offenders-dislike conditions, and
preference decrease in Caltech students-dislike or sex offenders-like
conditions). For both preference changes and brain activations, subject-mean
centering was performed to remove between-subjects variance before
computing correlations. *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001 (after Bonferroni correction for
14 tests, see Table 2).
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The Neural Correlates of Cognitive Balancestriking as participants did not in fact remember how the t-shirts
had been rated by students or offenders 4 months ago, per-
forming at chance on a forced-choice memory task (see
Supplemental Information).
fMRI Results: Tracking Cognitive Imbalance
To identify brain regions within which activation correlated with
the CII on a trial-by-trial basis for both liked and disliked groups,
we carried out a conjunction analysis (see Experimental Proce-
dures for details). This showed activation in pMFC, especially
in dmPFC (Figure 2B), as well as left insula, left inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG), and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) (see Table 1;
Figure S3). A further quantification of this finding was provided
by a region of interest (ROI) analysis that found that the dmPFC
region showed particularly increased activation in conditions
featuring cognitive imbalance, and a significant three-way inter-
action (group 3 self-preference 3 other preference; F(1,17) =
19.7, p < 0.001) (Figure 2C) that paralleled the behavioral findings
described above. These results confirm that dmPFC activation in
our task depends on a triadic relationship between self, other,
and an object of shared evaluation, providing a direct neural
correlate of cognitive imbalance according to balance theory
(Heider, 1946, 1958). Left insula and left IFG also showed the
same three-way interaction (p < 0.01), whereas PCC did not
(p = 0.83, not significant) (see Figure S3). As a confirmatory anal-
ysis, when we directly explored the three-way interaction
contrast (i.e., imbalance versus balance contrast), significant
activations were found in dmPFC and left IFG (see Figure S4A).
There was no region significantly negatively correlated with
the CII. However, when the four balanced conditions were
compared with the four imbalanced conditions, we found signif-
icant activation in ventral striatum, consistent with prior reports
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Klucharev et al., 2009).
Furthermore, this striatal area overlapped with the region sensi-
tive to reward that was identified by our MIDT (Figures S4B and
S4C), consistent with the hypothesis that not only agreeing with
liked others (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Klucharev et al.,
2009), but also disagreeing with disliked others may both be
rewarding. Right insula and right IFG were also activated in
this contrast (see Figure S4B; Supplemental Informationfor
details).
We also tested whether any region showed an association
with CII that might differ between the two groups (students,
offenders) and found only one: right middle temporal gyrus566 Neuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.(MTG; x = 40, y = –68, z = 18; 256 voxels) was more strongly
associated with the CII for students than for offenders (no area
was found in the reverse contrast). Overall, the findings suggest
that a qualitatively similar mechanism operates to represent
cognitive imbalance evoked by both liked and disliked groups
of other people, notably recruiting the dmPFC.
Association between Brain Activation and Preference
Change
Activation of pMFC has been associated with behavioral adjust-
ment following negative or unexpected outcomes (Bush et al.,
2002; Jocham et al., 2009; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; Shima and Tanji, 1998; Ullsperger et al., 2004). As
the CII in our study is significantly associated both with subse-
quent preference change as well as activation within specific
brain regions (Table 1), it naturally follows that activations in
these regions should also be associated with preference
change. To show this, we pooled the within-subject correlation
between brain activation and preference change across the
eight experimental conditions of interest (see Figure 1D). Among
all brain regions identified above, the dmPFC showed the
strongest association between CII-evoked activation and
subsequent behavioral preference change (Figure 3A; Table 2).
Our analysis thus confirmed that the higher the dmPFC activa-
tion when viewing others’ preference for the same item, the
larger the subsequent preference change in the direction
predicted by balance theory (Heider, 1946, 1958).
The association between dmPFC activation during the initial
fMRI experiment and later preference change also remained sig-
nificant even after 4 months (Figure 3B), and the dmPFC was the
only region that survived a correction for multiple comparisons
across both time points (initial change and 4 months later; see
Table 2). As subjects no longer remembered the original ratings
at 4 months later, a single episode of feedback about the
Table 2. Correlations between Regional Activation and
Preference Changes
Brain Area Day 1 4 Months Later
r(144) p value r(120) p value
dmPFC 0.24 0.027* 0.37 0.001***
L insula 0.17 0.29 0.30 0.007**
L IFG 0.05 1 0.15 0.76
PCC 0.03 1 0.10 1
R ventral striatum 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.31
R insula 0.12 1 0.28 0.015*
R IFG 0.13 0.91 0.24 0.062
dmPFC, left insula, left IFG, and PCC were significantly positively corre-
lated with the CII (see Figures 2 and S3). Right ventral striatum, right
insula, and right IFG were significantly activated by the contrast of all
balanced conditions versus all imbalanced conditions (see Figure S4B).
Correlations for day 1 are based on 18 subjects so that there are 144
data points (18 subjects 3 8 conditions). Correlations for 4 months later
are based on 15 subjects so that there are 120 data points (15 subjects
3 8 conditions). For both preference changes and brain activities,
subject-mean centering was performed to remove between-subjects
variance before computing correlations. Reported p values (one-tailed)
are Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons (a total of 14 correla-
tions). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Neuron
The Neural Correlates of Cognitive Balanceopinions of other people thus results in dmPFC activation that
correlates with long-lasting preference change likely to be
implicit.
Two Localizer Tasks
The two commonly used localizer tasks we employed in our
study (Bush and Shin, 2006; Knutson et al., 2000) successfully
identified areas within pMFC especially sensitive to response
conflict (pre-SMA) or negative outcome (posterior part of
dmPFC) (Figure 4A; Supplemental Information; Figure S5). The
region related to response conflict was posterior to that related
to negative outcome, consistent with prior findings (Hikosaka
and Isoda, 2010; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Rushworth et al.,
2004). The functional role of these anatomical regions in each
of the two localizer tasks was qualitatively distinct (Henson,
2006): the beta values for each condition of each localizer task
from each peak within pre-SMA and posterior dmPFC showed
a significant three-way interaction (anatomical region3 localizer
task 3 task condition; F(1,17) = 9.03, p = 0.008) (Figure 4B).
Importantly, the cognitive imbalance-related dmPFC region we
described earlier largely overlapped with the area involved in
negative outcome, whereas there was no overlap at all with the
pre-SMA involved in response conflict (Figure 4A). There was a
significant four-way interaction (region 3 group 3 self prefer-
ence 3 other preference; F(1,17) = 11.8, p = 0.003) (Figures 4C
and 4D): whereas activation within the posterior dmPFC was
modulated by a triadic relationship among self, others, and
objects as postulated by balance theory (significant three-way
interaction; F(1,17) = 12.7, p = 0.002) (Figure 4D), activation
within the pre-SMA was insensitive to this (p = 0.87, not signifi-
cant) (Figure 4C). Thus, the present results argue against the
idea that cognitive imbalance and response conflict share neural
mechanisms and instead suggest that cognitive imbalanceactivates the dmPFC because it represents an aversive outcome
requiring subsequent adjustment.
A final point of clarification concerned whether the dmPFC
activation we found might have arisen from expectancy violation
(Somerville et al., 2006) or surprise signal (unsigned reward pre-
diction error) (Hayden et al., 2011): participants might simply
expect other students to give preference ratings similar to their
own, and sex offenders to have different preferences, con-
founding the CII with the degree of expectancy violation. To
address this issue, we asked participants at the end of the exper-
iment to guess the other group’s preference for those t-shirts
that had been presented in the control condition (about which
no feedback had been given). Expectations of the other group’s
preferences were not related to self-preferences for either group
(mean correlation coefficients were not significantly different
from zero; p > 0.80) (Figure S6A). Furthermore, there was no
change in the strength of the association between CII and
dmPFC activation across the sequence of three runs of our study
(Figure S6B), thus showing no indication of a change in expec-
tancy with learning over sessions. Simple expectation violation
is thus unlikely to be the mechanism whereby CII drives activa-
tion within the dmPFC (see Supplemental Information for further
details).
DISCUSSION
Our attitudes and preferences are potently influenced by other
people, effects formalized in social psychology theories (Abelson
et al., 1968; Heider, 1946, 1958; Osgood and Tannenbaum,
1955). The present study showed that an individual’s preference
for goods is influenced by the difference between one’s own
preference and the preferences of other people; however, it
also depends on one’s attitude toward those other people. The
present results show that cognitive imbalance, a key concept
in classical social psychology, is associated with activation in
the dmPFC. Consistent with the idea of balance theory (Heider,
1946, 1958), that cognitive balance depends on a triadic relation-
ship among self, others, and objects, we found that the dmPFC
activation depended on these three factors, and its activity
tracked the degree of cognitive imbalance on a trial-by-trial
basis. While the dmPFC showed greater activation, the further
a subject’s preference was from that of a liked group of other
people, this relationship was completely reversed for a disliked
group of people. The pattern of activations we observed clearly
indicates that our brain does not simply encode the difference
between our own and another’s preference, but that it also
depends on how we feel about the other person. In other words,
the dmPFC encodes the difference between a person’s current
preference state and a cognitively balanced state.
Our study further demonstrated that the effect of cognitive
imbalance on preference change was remarkably long lasting.
People’s preference change remained influenced by the opinion
of others even after 4months, despite the fact that they no longer
remembered how each t-shirt had been rated by others. We also
confirmed that the dmPFC activation is correlated with the
degree of preference change. Although this significant correla-
tion itself is not surprising as the dmPFC region is identified by
using the CII that is related to preference change (Figures S1ANeuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 567
Figure 4. pMFC Areas Sensitive to Response Conflict and Negative Outcome
(A) Response conflict-related areas were localized by the contrast of Interference versus Control conditions in the MSIT task (Bush and Shin, 2006), which
activated the pre-SMA (x = –6, y = 12, z = 44). Negative outcome-related areas were localized by the contrast of Miss versus Hit feedback in the MIDT task
(Knutson et al., 2000), which activated the posterior part of dmPFC (x = 6, y = 30, z = 46). The yellow outline indicates the dmPFC areas significantly correlatedwith
CII in our balance task (cf. Figure 2B). See also Figure S5.
(B) Activation patterns in pre-SMA and posterior dmPFC during the two localizer tasks. Beta values were extracted using a leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) cross-
validation procedure from the local maxima from the peak activation identified by the Interference versus Control contrast (pre-SMA) and the Miss versus Hit
contrast (posterior dmPFC) (see Experimental Procedures for more details).
(C and D) Activation patterns in (C) pre-SMA and (D) posterior dmPFC during the feedback period of the t-shirt rating task. Means and SEM shown.
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The Neural Correlates of Cognitive Balanceand S1C), the fact that among all regions related to cognitive
balance, the dmPFC activation was the most strongly associ-
ated with preference change both immediately after social
feedback as well as 4 months later suggests that the dmPFC
plays a pivotal role in adjusting one’s preference so as to restore
cognitive balance.
The present findings are consistent with two previous neuroi-
maging studies (Izuma et al., 2010; van Veen et al., 2009)
showing that the pMFC (including dACC as well as dmPFC) is
activated by ‘‘cognitive dissonance,’’ another form of cognitive
inconsistency that is induced by the discrepancy between
what we believe and what we do (Festinger, 1957). Since
pMFC activation is sensitive to the degree of cognitive disso-
nance (Izuma et al., 2010) and cognitive imbalance on a trial-
by-trial basis, neural activation within this region may be a direct
physiological measure of cognitive inconsistency in general.
While cognitive consistency theories once dominated social
psychology especially during the 1950s to 1970s, their influence
has declined in the past few decades. One reason for the decline
may be the historically heavy reliance on self-report measures
(Greenwald et al., 2002). Early research on balance theory using568 Neuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.self-report produced findings that were at times unreliable and
contradictory, arising especially from the complexity of cases
where the attitude of self toward the other person is negative
(Insko, 1984). The present results may provide a more valid
measure of cognitive inconsistency that is conceptually aligned
with theory, as we observed a similar degree of dmPFC activa-
tion and preference change in all imbalanced conditions,
whether the other social group was one whose opinions were
to be avoided or to be emulated. The symmetry of our results
may indicate that pMFC activation is a conceptually more valid
measure of cognitive inconsistency than is verbal report by itself.
Given that the framework of balance theory has been applied to
many central topics in social psychology, such as stereotyping,
self-esteem, and self-conceptualization (Greenwald et al., 2002;
see also Gawronski, 2012), it will be an important future project
to confirm that the brain regions we identify in the present study
also play a key role in other social processes.
The dmPFC activation found in the present study may reflect
a number of different processes, none of them mutually
exclusive. One possibility is that cognitive imbalance in our
task engages processing analogous to emotional reappraisal
Neuron
The Neural Correlates of Cognitive Balance(Etkin et al., 2011; Ochsner and Gross, 2008). dmPFC and dACC
activations are often associated with reduction in negative
emotion through reappraisal (Etkin et al., 2011; Ochsner and
Gross, 2008). Social psychologists have often conceptualized
cognitively inconsistent states (cognitive imbalance and cogni-
tive dissonance) as emotionally aversive, providing the driving
force for subsequent attitude change (Abelson et al., 1968;
Festinger, 1957; Gawronski and Strack, 2012; Heider, 1946,
1958), similar to the change in evaluation that drives emotion
reappraisal. As dmPFC activation is associated with a decrease
(not increase) of negatively valenced affect through reappraisal,
it may be that the dmPFC activity found in the present study does
not simply reflect the level of negative affect per se, but rather the
motivation for cognitive reappraisal or adjustment, which leads
to the desired consequence of cognitively balanced states.
Two other possibilities for the processes corresponding to our
observed dmPFC activation are the registration of negative
(aversive) outcomes or response conflict. As stated above, pre-
vious fMRI studies on cognitive dissonance consistently found
that pMFC is involved in cognitive dissonance (Izuma et al.,
2010; van Veen et al., 2009). Based solely on the general finding
that pMFC is activated by cognitive dissonance (i.e., using
reverse inference), these studies interpreted the pMFCactivation
as meaning that a common neural mechanism is responsible for
response-level conflict and cognitive-level conflict (Izuma et al.,
2010; van Veen et al., 2009). However, because pMFC is known
to be activated by a variety of cognitive processes other than
response conflict, reverse inference based on pMFC activation
is especially problematic (Poldrack, 2011). To circumvent this
problem, the present study used two independent localizer tasks
in the same participants: we found that the dmPFC region
tracking cognitive imbalance overlapped with a region sensitive
to negative outcome, but not at all with activation related to
response conflict. While these findings will need to be followed
up with other methods, they suggest that response conflict is
unlikely to come into play during cognitive imbalance, whereas
aversive outcomes may be a candidate for what is represented
by the dmPFC in our task. Similarly, it has been suggested that
pMFC generates a negative prediction error-like signal that
induces social learning (conformity) (Klucharev et al., 2009; see
also Proulx et al., 2012). However, it should be noted that the
present findings suggest that dmPFC activation cannot be
explained merely by expectation violation. Rather, as we noted
above, the dmPFC appears to encode the discrepancy between
actual outcomes and outcomes that would be the most cogni-
tively consistent (i.e., what participants would hope to get, rather
than what they expected to get).
When proposed more than five decades ago, theories of
cognitive consistency revolutionized the way psychologists
thought about how human behavior ismotivated, replacing tradi-
tional behaviorist views of reward and punishment with cognitive
versions (Greenwald et al., 2002). The present findings in a sense
come full circle by arguing that cognitive imbalance works
through basic mechanisms for adjusting behavior following
aversive outcomes. The pMFC is known to respond to a variety
of aversive outcomes (Botvinick et al., 2001; Bush et al., 2002;
Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Falkenstein et al., 1991; Hiko-
saka and Isoda, 2010; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Miltner et al.,1997; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Shack-
man et al., 2011; Shima and Tanji, 1998; Ullsperger and von
Cramon, 2003), play a key role in detecting stimuli that signal
the deviation from a desired state, and induce subsequent
behavioral adjustment leading to desired consequences
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2004; Hiko-
saka and Isoda, 2010; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof
et al., 2004; Shackman et al., 2011; Ullsperger et al., 2004).
Our present results suggest that cognitive imbalance might
motivate preference change in much the same way as aversive
outcomes motivate behavioral change. It is important to note
that activation of the same brain region does not guarantee
the involvement of the same neural processes (Henson,
2006), rendering our process interpretation preliminary at this
stage. While it has been argued (Harmon-Jones, 2004) that
cognitive inconsistency might recruit the same region involved
in simple response conflict, this idea was never formally tested.
Our present finding that the area tracking cognitive
inconsistency was dissociated from the area related to response
conflict is inconsistent with this idea and indicates that neural
processes underlying cognitive conflict such as cognitive
imbalance (and cognitive dissonance) and response conflict
are likely distinct.
A final possibility to consider in interpreting the dmPFC activa-
tion we observed is suggested by the accumulating data that
dmPFC activation is found also in tasks that involve theory of
mind (Ochsner et al., 2004), the ability to reason about other
people’s mental states such as their beliefs. It has been argued
that dmPFC plays a key role in the uniquely human representa-
tion of triadic relations between two minds and an object
(Saxe, 2006), a schema quite similar to the basic idea of balance
theory. It might well be that our dmPFC activation, at least to
some degree, reflects this representation of triadic relations as
its activation was higher in our eight conditions of interest (where
the preference of others was presented) compared to the two
control conditions (where no feedback about others’ prefer-
ences was presented). However, the mentalizing hypothesis
cannot account for the significant three-way interaction pattern
found in dmPFC and its significant association with preference
change, suggesting that this is unlikely to be the whole
explanation.
It should be noted that although we framed Caltech students
as a liked group and sex offenders as a disliked group in the pre-
sent study, it is likely that these two groups differ also on dimen-
sions other than likeability (or what balance theory called a
‘‘sentiment’’ relationship). For example, subjects might perceive
Caltech students as similar and sex offenders as dissimilar to
themselves, evoking in-group and out-group biases that could
influence cognitive consistency irrespective of overt likeability.
It will be important in future studies to decorrelate these and
other attributes in order to determine precisely which are
primarily driving the effect we observed. On the other hand, it
seems reasonable to suppose that several attributes, including
valenced likeability, similarity to self, and so forth, all contribute.
Indeed, balance theory postulates that not only a ‘‘sentiment
relationship,’’ but also a ‘‘unit relationship’’ (i.e., similarity, prox-
imity, causality, membership, possession, or belonging) influ-
ence social balance (Heider, 1946, 1958); to what extent theseNeuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 569
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topics to be explored in the future.
The dmPFC signal that we found appears to reflect unfavor-
able outcomes that motivate preference change. This interpreta-
tion of dmPFC function in cognitive balance should be situated
within a network of other brain regions involved in reward pro-
cessing, several of which we also found activated in some con-
trasts in our study. Thus, imbalance versus balance differentially
activated the IFG, a region implicated in cognitive control and
change in opinion (Sharot et al., 2011); the insula, possibly
related to evoked emotional responses; and the ventral striatum,
involved in processing reward prediction errors and activated
when others agreewith one’s own opinion (Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2010; Klucharev et al., 2009). It will be important to deter-
mine the causal roles of these regions, and whether they are truly
identical to the ones for general reward learning or contain spe-
cific neuronal populations that code cognitive balance sepa-
rately from general reward. As the phenomenon of cognitive
balance is unlikely to occur in nonhuman animals, such future
investigations will require lesion studies and rare intracranial
recordings in human patients for which the present study pro-
vides focused hypotheses.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Twenty Caltech undergraduate or graduate students who had never rated any
of our t-shirt designs previously completed two fMRI experiments. Data from
two participants were removed due to excessive head motion in the scanner,
and all reported analyses are based on the remaining 18 (six female, mean
age = 22.5 ± 2.6 years, all right-handed with no history of neurological or
psychiatric illness). Fifteen of the 18 subjects also participated in the third
preference-rating task (four female). All subjects gave written informed
consent for participation, and the study was approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the California Institute of Technology.
Experimental Paradigm
The experiment consisted of three phases performed on three separate days:
(1) first and second preference-rating tasks as described above (fMRI experi-
ment; Figure 1), (2) two localizer tasks (Bush and Shin, 2006; Knutson et al.,
2000) (fMRI experiment), and (3) third preference-rating task (behavioral
experiment; in 15/18 participants). The order of the two fMRI experiments
was counterbalanced across subjects, and these two experiments were sepa-
rated by a mean of 12.7 (±6.2) days. The mean interval between first and third
preference-rating tasks was 124.9 (±20.2) days.
First and Second Preference-Rating Tasks
On the first day, inside the fMRI scanner, subjects were presented with a front
image of a t-shirt and the scale on the monitor and asked to rate how much
they liked each t-shirt using a 14 point scale (Figure 1C). Discrete ratings
were given using a button box with three buttons: subjects used the right index
finger to shift a cursor one point leftward in the scale, themiddle finger to shift it
one point rightward, and then decided by pressing a button with the ring finger.
Subjects had no time limit to indicate their preference but were instructed not
to think too much about it. The mean response time was 4.16 (±1.28) s.
Immediately after giving their ratings, subjects were presented with their
preference depicted by a thumbs-up (for ratings R8) or thumbs-down icon
(for ratings %7) for 0.5 s, and then presented with how others rated the
same item in terms of thumbs-up (others liked the item) or thumbs-down
(others disliked the item) for 2 s (Figure 1D).
Subjects rated a total of 174 t-shirt designs, which had been selected from
an Internet t-shirt store, randomly preassigned to one of three conditions
(Caltech, offenders, or control). In 72 trials, subjects were presented with570 Neuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc.ratings they were told were given by other Caltech students. In another 72
trials, they were presented with ratings they were told were given by sex
offenders who are currently in jail. These two groups were chosen based on
extensive piloting to maximize their influence on the preferences of the
population from which our subject sample was drawn (Caltech students; see
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for further details). In the remaining
trials (30 trials), no information about other people’s preference was presented
(control condition). Before the fMRI experiment, all subjects were led to believe
that we had collected preference data for the same 174 t-shirts from other
Caltech students and from sex offenders a fewmonths previously. Participants
were further told that only the worst sex offenders were included in this study,
and all subjects read brief descriptions about the sex offenders before the fMRI
experiment began. In reality, others’ ratings were experimentally determined
such that Caltech students’ (or sex offenders’) likes or dislikes were approxi-
mately equally distributed between t-shirts liked or disliked by the participants
themselves. Poststudy questions verified that all participants believed they
received feedback from Caltech students and sex offender groups as we
intended.
About 5 min after the first preference-rating task, subjects were asked to
rate the same 174 t-shirts again using a 14 point scale inside the scanner.
No information about others’ preference was presented this time. After these
two rating tasks, subjects came out of the fMRI scanner and were asked to
guess others’ (Caltech students’ or sex offenders’) preferences for the 30
t-shirts presented in the control condition, using the same 14 point scale. In
this task, subjects were instructed to give a best guess about the average
preference of Caltech students or sex offenders for each t-shirt (these latter
data were used to test for expectancy violation as a possible mechanism in
our findings; cf. main text and Supplemental Experimental Procedures); the
order of ratings (guessing Caltech students’ preference first or sex offenders’
preference first) was counterbalanced across subjects.
Finally, all subjects were asked to rate their impression toward other Caltech
students or sex offenders (see below for details). Six items each were used for
the impression ratings about the two social groups: (1) how much do you
identify yourself as a member of Caltech students?; (2) how likable do you
find Caltech students in general?; (3) how similar do you think you are to other
Caltech students?; (4) how much do you think you and other Caltech students
have in common?; (5) to what extent would you use the term ‘‘we’’ to describe
yourself and other Caltech students?; and (6) howmuch do you think youmight
like to interact with other Caltech students at some future time?; the phrase
‘‘other Caltech students’’ was replaced with ‘‘sex offenders’’ when rating sex
offenders. Impressions were rated on a 14 point scale (1 = not at all, 14 =
very much). These six items showed good internal consistency for the rating
of both groups (Caltech students Cronbach’s a = 0.92; sex offenders
Cronbach’s a = 0.75).
Two Localizer Tasks
All subjects also completed two localizer tasks: (1) the Multi-Source Interfer-
ence Task (Bush and Shin, 2006) (MSIT), and (2) a Monetary Incentive Delay
Task (Knutson et al., 2000) (MIDT). The MSIT is well known to robustly and
reliably activate response conflict-related pMFC regions (Bush and Shin,
2006; Bush et al., 2003). The MIDT is a simple button-response task involving
monetary reward (Knutson et al., 2000). As it allows subjects to get perfor-
mance-contingent positive (hit) or negative (miss) feedback multiple times
within a short period of time, it reliably activates brain areas responsive to
negative feedback compared to positive feedback (although it may not be
entirely specific in this regard, also encompassing processes such as reward
prediction error).
During the MSIT, subjects were presented with a set of three numbers (1, 2,
3, or 0) on the center of the screen, and one number was always different from
the other two numbers. The task was to report the identity of the number that is
different from the other two numbers by using a button box with three buttons
each of which represents one, two, and three from left to right. It was empha-
sized that subjects needed to report what the target number was regardless of
its position. In the control blocks, the target number (1, 2, or 3) alwaysmatched
its spatial position and nontarget numbers were always zero (e.g., 100, 020,
003). On the other hand, in the interference blocks, the target number never
matched its spatial position, and the distracters (nontarget numbers) were
Neuron
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(42 s), subjects performed 24 control or 24 interference trials. Each set of
numbers was presented for 500 ms with an interstimulus interval (ISI) of
1250 ms. Within an fMRI run, subjects completed three control and three
interference blocks in alternating order. Thirty second fixation periods were
inserted at the beginning and the end of each fMRI run. All subjects completed
two fMRI runs (each 7 min).
During the MIDT, subjects were first presented with one of three cues
indicating $0, $0.2, or $2 for 0.5 s. After a random delay (2–2.5 s), a white
square was just briefly presented at the center of the screen, and the task
was to press a button as soon as this white square was detected. If a subject
pressed the button while the square was still on the screen, they could obtain
the amount of money specified during the cue period. The duration of the
square presentation was dynamically adjusted between 160 to 300 ms on a
trial-by-trial basis for each subject during the task so that subjects could hit
the target about 66% of trials. If they successfully hit the target, a hit feedback
appeared on the screen (e.g., ‘‘You won $2.00’’) for 0.8 s. Similarly, if they
missed the target, a miss feedback was presented (e.g., ‘‘Miss!’’). Intertrial
interval (ITI) was 1.5 s. Subjects performed a total of 45 trials in randomized
order in each fMRI run (i.e., 15 trials each for $0, $0.2, and $2 trials), and
they completed two fMRI runs (each 6 min).
Before the fMRI experiment, subjects performed a brief practice session
using a laptop computer for both MSIT and MIDT outside the scanner. At
the end of the two localizer experiments, subjects were given all the money
they earned during the MIDT.
Third Preference-Rating Task
After approximately 4 months from the first and second preference-rating
tasks, all 18 subjects were asked to take part in a follow-up behavioral exper-
iment, and 15 out of 18 subjects (four female) participated. In this follow-up
experiment, subjects were asked to rate the same 174 t-shirts again using
the same 14 point scale, followed by a memory task. The memory task
presented each subject with the 144 t-shirts that had been previously associ-
ated with either Caltech students’ or sex offenders’ ratings (i.e., t-shirts
presented in the control conditions were not presented during the memory
test). Below each t-shirt, there were four options (Caltech students Liked,
Caltech students Disliked, Sex offenders Liked, or Sex offenders Disliked),
and they were asked to pick one.
fMRI Data Acquisition
All fMRI data were acquired using a Siemens 3.0 Tesla Trio scanner with a 32
channel phased array headcoil. For functional imaging, interleaved T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequences were used to
produce 44 contiguous 3-mm-thick trans-axial slices covering nearly the entire
cerebrum (repetition time [TR] = 2,500 ms; echo time [TE] = 30 ms; flip angle
[FA] = 80; field of view [FOV] = 192 mm; 64 3 64 matrix; voxel dimensions =
3.0 3 3.0 3 3.0 mm). A high-resolution anatomical T1-weighted image (1 mm
isotropic resolution) was also acquired for each subject.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
The data were analyzed using SPM8 (WellcomeDepartment of Imaging Neuro-
science) implemented in MATLAB 7.8 (MathWorks). Before data processing
and statistical analysis, we discarded the first four volumes to allow for
equilibration. After correcting for differences in slice timing within each image
volume, head motion was corrected. Following realignment, the volumes were
normalized to MNI space using a transformation matrix obtained from the
normalization of the first EPI image of each individual subject to the EPI
template. The normalized fMRI data were spatially smoothed with an isotropic
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm (full-width at half-maximum).
fMRI Data Analysis
We used two general linear models (GLM) to analyze the fMRI data for the first
preference-rating task; one GLM was intended to identify brain regions corre-
lated with the degree of cognitive imbalance on a trial-by-trial basis, and the
other GLM was for extracting brain activation for each of ten conditions (Fig-
ure 1D) for detailed analysis of activation patterns. Since the present study
focuses on brain activation while subjects perceive balanced or imbalancedsituations (feedback period during the first preference-rating task), the fMRI
data from the second preference-rating task were not analyzed.
For the first GLM, we first quantified the degree of imbalance in each trial as
the discrepancy/similarity between subject’s own and others’ rating (i.e.,
Cognitive Imbalance Index; CII). For Caltech students’ rating, the greater the
difference between a participant’s and Caltech students’ rating, the larger
the CII. In contrast, for sex offenders’ rating, the more similar a participant’s
rating is to sex offenders’ ratings, the larger the CII. Therefore, the CII can
be quantified as follows:
CII= 14 subject0s first rating ðif Caltech students like
or sex offenders dislike itemsÞ
CII= subject
0
s first rating  1 ðif Caltech students like
or sex offenders dislike itemsÞ
The CII for items in the two control conditions are always 0. Thus, the CII has
the possible range of 0–13 (see Table S1).
Therefore, the first model included (1) each t-shirt presentation (duration =
subject’s response time), (2) t-shirt presentation modulated by subject’s
preference for each t-shirt, (3) t-shirt presentation modulated by the number
of button pressed until subjects decide their rating, (4) Caltech students’ feed-
back presentation (2 s), (5) Caltech students feedback presentationmodulated
by the CII, (6) sex offenders’ feedback presentation (2 s), and (7) sex offenders
feedback presentation modulated by the CII. Items in the control condition
were randomly divided into halves and allocated to either Caltech students
or sex offender conditions.
The second GLM modeled the feedback period (2 s) separately for each of
ten conditions (see Figure 1D), and thus included following regressors: (1) each
t-shirt presentation (duration = response time), (2) t-shirt presentation modu-
lated by subject’s preference for each t-shirt, (3) t-shirt presentation modu-
lated by the number of button pressed until subjects decide their rating, (4)
feedback presentation for the Self-Like and Caltech students-Like condition,
(5) feedback presentation for Self-Like and Caltech students-Dislike condition,
(6) feedback presentation for the Self-Dislike and Caltech students-Like con-
dition, (7) feedback presentation for Self-Dislike and Caltech students-Dislike
condition, (8) feedback presentation for the Self-Like and sex offenders-Like
condition, (9) feedback presentation for Self-Like and sex offenders-Dislike
condition, (10) feedback presentation for the Self-Dislike and sex offenders-
Like condition, (11) feedback presentation for Self-Dislike and sex offenders-
Dislike condition, (12) feedback presentation for the Self-Like-Control condi-
tion, and (13) feedback presentation for the Self-Dislike-Control condition.
We first carried out a conjunction analysis with a masking procedure to
define common networks of CII-related activations for both student and
offender groups using the first GLM. We employed an inclusive masking pro-
cedure so that areas identified by the conjunction analysis were significantly
associated with CIIs for both the student as well as the sex offender conditions
(p < 0.001 uncorrected, and cluster p < 0.05 familywise error [FWE] corrected),
an approach logically analogous to a conjunction analysis with a conjunction
null hypothesis (Friston et al., 2005; Nichols et al., 2005). Subsequently, ROI
analyses were carried out using a leave-one-subject-out (LOSO) cross-
validation procedure (Esterman et al., 2010) in order to eliminate nonindepen-
dence bias for plots of parameter estimates. We reran the second-level
analysis (first GLM) 18 times with a different single subject left out in each,
and each second-level analysis was used to determine the ROIs for each
left-out subject. Beta values were extracted from relevant local maxima for
each subject for ten conditions (Figure 1D) by using the second GLM, and
these values were averaged to plot overall effect sizes (Figures 2C and S3).
For fMRI data analysis on the MSIT, the model included two regressors for
each of the control and interference blocks (42 s). To account for phasic
activations that might be accompanied by error processing, error trials regard-
less of conditions were also modeled as a separate regressor of no interest.
For fMRI data analysis on the MIDT, the model included the following
regressors: (1) cue onset, (2) cue onset modulated by reward level ($0, $0.2,
or $2), (3) feedback onset for $0-Hit trials, (4) feedback onset for $0-Miss trials,
(5) feedback onset for $0.2-Hit trials, (6) feedback onset for $0.2-Miss trials, (7)
feedback onset for $2-Hit trials, (8) feedback onset for $2-Miss trials, andNeuron 78, 563–573, May 8, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 571
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response). For both localizer tasks, average effect sizes were plotted using
the above-mentioned LOSO cross-validation procedure (Figure 4B).
For all GLMs, the regressors were calculated using a box-car function
convolved with a hemodynamic-response function. Other regressors that
were of no interest, such as six motion parameters, the session effect, and
high-pass filtering (128 s) were also included.
For all fMRI results reported (preference-rating task and two localizer tasks),
a whole-brain statistical threshold was set at p < 0.001 voxelwise (uncorrected)
and cluster p < 0.05 (FWE corrected for multiple comparisons).SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes six figures, one table, and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2013.03.023.
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